(5-minute read)

. . . This is a continuation from Part I

PART II

The Solution (March-June 2015)

Creative problem-solving

Diplomatically communicating the router launch timing error and its competitive ramifications is my priority. CableCo executives have long been axiomatically reciting the “Q3 2015” launch date both internally and with suppliers. As a result, they are deeply skeptical of contrarian information coming from a newcomer. Packaged with the bad news is my recommended near-term solution:

• Quickly launch an intermediate product.  Firmware can be developed much faster than new hardware. I propose the idea of “Wave 1.5”. Current-gen devices do not have the Wave 2 signature 4^th 5GHz radio chain and their silicon cannot support MU-MIMO. Nonetheless, useful new functionality can be added with a firmware update: public WiFi, static IP addresses, higher transmission power, and new data model.    

• Streamline product development process.  The fastest path to market is for CableCo to revert to non-custom casing, pre-select two or three hardware vendors, have them each produce a custom-featured prototype, use a compressed testing process, and fast-track internal approvals. Specifying chip brand diversity insures against flaws in young silicon. A device taking longer to pass CableCo’s test thresholds can be awarded only a nominal sliver of the market. The sourcing decision can focus on price and relationship quality (e.g., turnaround time on bug fixes), rather than strictly on technical performance in testing. Bugs identified in post-launch testing can be fixed in firmware updates. I produce new RFQ and RFP documents and a proposal how CableCo can shave six months off the Wave 2 commercialization process with this approach. 

• Shift positioning from “fastest” to “smartest”.   CableCo can reposition itself as offering the most intelligent WiFi—unapologetically ceding speed claims to the retail router market and to ISPs with fiber optic deployments. In terms of product features, smart WiFi means range extender hardware with radio resource management (RRM) software—plus real-time, continuous CPE performance data visible to Customer Service agents. This shift would be timely, as nascent customer demand for multiple APs is expected to increase with Wave 2 (due to MU-MIMO and 160MHz rate-at-range limitations). 

• Align next-gen product features to market.  CableCo must decide which features provide the most benefit to the greatest number of customers—considering competitors’ pipeline offerings and Customer Service operations. For example, 160MHz channel width benefits a small segment of high-end customers, who likely prefer a high-end retail router over a CableCo router anyway.  Additionally, the draft PRD is trying to solve a signal range problem that likely affects a modest segment of customers . . . and which could alternatively be solved via separate range extender hardware. Conversely, the existing draft PRD may have under-specified the network processor relative to its many CPU-intensive WiFi specs (which can cause device auto-reboots, which provoke costly calls to customer service). I correct and finalize the PRD during my tenure, while also streamlining it by 15% with an overall re-write.

I also explore—but ultimately reject—developing a stripped-down “Wave 2 Lite” device. With one pre-selected vendor, no customization, no 160MHz feature, and all hands on deck, CableCo could launch a 4×4 device in Q1 2016. Marketing believes this would be sufficient to defend its “fastest-WiFi” message on a legal basis. However, Engineering is emphatic that running two parallel product development processes is unfeasible. “Wave 2 Lite” only makes sense if CableCo intends to further delay the Wave 2 process such that the two products could be developed serially. 

Strategic thinking

My discovery of the product development mistake catalyzes CableCo’s recognition of the need for a WiFi product strategy. Unanswered questions on the table include:

• How profitable should the WiFi business be?  What business performance metrics matter? 
• Should CableCo subsidize WiFi devices to increase penetration over retail devices?  (In order to enable public WiFi and WiFi calling?  And/or to monetize cellular network data offloading?)
• For which target customer segment should CableCo design its routers?  Is there value to developing two devices with distinct performance levels and price? 
• How many customers experience sub-optimal signal strength and data rate, and how often?  How quickly will demand for whole-home WiFi escalate?
• Do we expect the 18-month technology generation cycle to continue? 
• What is the video-WiFi hardware convergence timeline?  
• Should the advent of smart speaker / automation hub devices influence CableCo’s CPE aesthetic and/or technical design?    

CableCo needs ample time to address these novel questions. But, according to Marketing, further delaying the Wave 2 device is too risky. Moreover, with only 1.5 million Wave 2 devices projected for deployment, the Wave 2 decision’s $150 million price tag is considerably smaller than CableCo modem and video CPE decisions. Therefore, CableCo’s best path is to proceed with Wave 2 router development (as well as immediately launch the Wave 1.5 intermediate product), without muddying the waters by pausing the development process to retroactively come up with a wraparound strategy. Once a WiFi product strategy is fleshed out, CableCo can apply it to the “next next-gen” 11ax device in 2018.

Other work

Addressing newly discovered Wave 2 product development problems is just one of many out-of-scope tasks I take on during the frenetically paced four-month CableCo engagement:

• Commercialize a substitute current-gen router in record time, to resolve an acute supply chain crisis identified in my second week (the Wave 1.5 device)
• Create and lead a nine-department working group to determine remote provisioning approach for millions of incoming CPE from the pending merger
• Build a probabilistic simulation model of router volume requirements to support dual-sourcing negotiations
• Build the first-ever financial model of the WiFi business (a probabilistic simulation model quantifying break-even changes in acquisition, churn, and support levers to offset increases in wholesale cost of hardware)
• Create a first-ever WiFi product roadmap
• Introduce and facilitate video-WiFi hardware convergence discussions
• Kick off an initiative to overhaul customer service call codes with added granularity (to generate data to inform future router design)
• Work with Network Operations to figure out a hack to sample CPE RSSI data until such time as the new data model is implemented (to inform multi-AP strategy)
• Research and recommend wired and wireless range extender hardware solutions
• Posit re-visiting CableCo’s “never-MOCA” mantra in light of the pending merger and evolution in customer demand for whole-home WiFi
• Kick off an RRM vendor selection process
• Prepare an SSID re-branding proposal
• Work with Network Operations, Supply Chain, and Billing to quantify (and replace the loose estimates that have been used to date) exactly how many residential WiFi devices CableCo has deployed on its network
• Prepare technology generation labelling and product line name rationalization proposals
• Work with Network Security to identify the root cause of DNS server slowdowns and then pitch a CPE swap solution
• Collaborate with Legal to create a retail WiFi and modem device white-listing policy
• Codify the firmware update process for hardware vendors
• Present an end-of-life analysis and proposal for an old device model
• Ideate and kick off Wave 1.5 firmware development, re-write the RFQ/RFP for a compressed development process, re-write the 50-page PRD, and structure/present the strategy questions listed above

I also handle the originally-contemplated in-scope tasks: 

• Manage an ongoing customer-facing web development project
• Respond to occasional cleanroom information requests related to the pending merger.

What do you think happened next?! Read about the real-world outcome in Part III.